Abstract: This paper investigates the evolution of income inequality in Spain during its transition to democracy, suggesting a method for the correction of under-reporting of earnings and profits in the Household Budget Surveys' data. The contribution is twofold: the methodological proposal, based on incomeexpenditure discrepancy and scaling-up to National Accounts, improves on previous work, and can be convenient for similar historical sources in other countries. Secondly, its application results in an alternative history of the distribution of income in this case, changing the levels and also the observed trend. Previous literature asserted a substantial equalization, related to the democratization process, while after the adjustment inequality in disposable income is shown to have been quite persistent.
Introduction
Income inequality is at the center of many debates. Political power, economic development or taxation are all related to the distribution of resources in any given country -or the world. This study takes a dynamic national perspective, and investigates how inequality changed during a period of transition from dictatorship to democracy.
The contribution of the paper is twofold. On the one hand, it is inserted on the debate about the distributional consequences of political transitions, providing an example where income inequality did not substantially decrease after democratization. Secondly, it does so by applying a correction methodology to the main historical source, namely the Household Budget Surveys, which leads to results challenging the prior consensus.
The literature on income distribution has undertaken many changes in the last decades. After the popularization of Kuznets (1955) 's theory about structural change and the decrease in inequality in advanced industrial countries, recent work has pointed at a new upsurge. Among its causes, globalization and skill-biased technological change hold pre-eminent places (Krugman, 2000; Atkinson, 2000; Easterly, 2004) . The slowdown of economic growth after the oil crises and the rise of unemployment could also have played a role in certain contexts.
This phenomenon, however, cannot be analysed as a purely economic issue. On the contrary, it is connected to political developments, such as the present rise of neo-liberalism and the deep crisis in social democracy in post-industrial societies. Levy and Temin (2007) argue that the widening of income inequality in the US since 1980 is largely related to the institutional context, which is shaped politically. Labour market regulation, the education system and fiscal redistribution all have strong distributive effects, as has also been underlined by Piketty (2003) for the latter.
In this context, transitions from dictatorship to democracy are expected to bring about a decrease in income inequality, as a result of the higher influence of the distributive goals of lower classes (Meltzer and Richard, 1981 and related literature) . But, as Acemoglu et al. (2013) note, the issue of transition might be complex and nuanced: the new regime can be "captured" by the elites and not result in fully democratic policies, and it can also lead to economic liberalization and increased market inequalities.
The Spanish transition is an interesting example for this discussion. Democratization came when the oil crises hit the country, and the early period of the new regime was marked by industrial restructuring and international integration, as well as by an unprecedented and dramatic increase in unemployment. The intensification of structural transformation and the development of welfare-state functions brought about by the ascent of social democracy to power could have pushed the income distribution in different directions. So which force prevailed? Was democratization a strong enough driver for equality?
Generally, studies on Spanish income inequality for the period 1970-90 have found that differences between the poor and the rich shrank substantially (e.g. Alcaide, 2000; Ayala et al., 2006) . This result is consistent with a positive impact of the political transition and the subsequent development of the Welfare State in the country. This work, however, reaches different conclusions.
The main data source for income distribution in this period are the Household Budget Surveys. Nevertheless, they suffer from a widely known problem of under-reporting of earnings, particularly those coming from self-employment and capital, which can potentially bring about a misrepresentation of the real levels of inequality.
1 I address the issue with an upwards correction of household incomes by revenue sources, using both internal and external information, and ultimately adjusting the flows to the National Accounts. This is common practice in Latin American studies (ECLAC, 1991) , and has recently been applied by an extensive literature focusing on inequality measurement issues in several countries (Accardo et al., 2009; Neri and Zizza, 2010; McColl et al., 2010; Fixler and Johnson, 2012) . 2 The majority of these works are very recent, and focus on the latest years available. This paper makes a step forward by adopting a historical perspective, and measuring the inequality trend over several decades.
After scaling up the income data, I find inequality to have been higher than usually assumed, and to have experienced only a very slight decrease in the transition from dictatorship to democracy. This suggests that, in Spain, the democratic transition was not sufficiently strong to impact positively on distributional dynamics. It also implies that under-reporting has to be taken into account in the study of income distribution and its changes over time. Differential rates of income concealing by source will not only mean higher inequality than that directly observed, but may also affect its trend, fundamentally in the presence of significant changes in the factorial distribution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the procedures and conclusions of previous literature on the topic, while also presenting the main data source used, the Household Budget Surveys. The methodology and process of correction of the data are exposed in section 3, and the results and some of their implications are reported in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
The story of personal income equalization
Literature has shown a widespread consensus on the fact that inequality decreased very substantially in Spain between the 1970s and the 1990s. This has been related to structural economic change and to an increase in the redistributive role played by the State in the second half of the period, due to democratization.
Those studies are generally derived from the Household Budget Surveys (henceforth HBSs).
These are consumption and income investigations conducted by the National Statistical Insti-on socio-economic classes, total household disposable income and expenditure in different categories of goods and services. The detail and quantity of information have improved over time.
Estimations of self-supply and imputed income from owner-occupied housing are also provided (thus indicating if the family rents or owns their house), as are the households' size and some information on their age composition. The income data always refers to disposable income, so each component is net of direct taxes: this is also the definition used all along this paper.
There are significant differences in the results obtained from this source. Some studies use the original income data provided by the surveys, while other rely on different correction procedures, since some troubling problems are widely known to be present in the HBSs. I will first review the results based on the original data, and then proceed to discuss the quality issues in the surveys.
Finally, I will show the corrections proposed by previous literature.
Working with the raw HBS data
The studies which use the raw HBS data are surveyed in table 1. They observe a significant reduction of inequality along these decades, attaining by 1990 levels comparable to those of other developed European countries. Many of these studies acknowledge the problems in the data, such as under-reporting, and therefore call for caution or test for possible impacts with techniques such as trimming (for instance, Cowell et al., 1999) or a comparison with National Accounts (Oliver et al., 2001) .
The values of the inequality indices vary depending on each author's methodological choices, such as the income definition, the equivalence scale applied, or the weighting unit. All these are important conceptual decisions to be made by the researcher. I deem preferable an income definition as wide as possible (TDI in the table, which includes in kind elements such as imputed owner-occupier income -but, recall, excludes direct taxation), and individual weighting. This last aspect may not have a big quantitative impact on the indices, but implies giving the same value in our calculations to all individuals (weighting by households effectively means attaching less importance to those living in big families). In any case, these choices do not change the qualitative result here: a decrease in inequality along with the political transition.
Alternatively, many authors are interested in working with inequality of consumption instead of income, or along with it (e.g. Del Río and Ruiz-Castillo, 1996; Martín-Guzmán et al., 1996; Goerlich and Mas, 2001; Gradín, 2002; Gradín et al., 2008) . They generally also find a decrease in inequality during the decades of 1970-90. 4 The rationale for this approach is that, in the context 3 It is not possible to rely on Personal Income Tax statistics to study income distribution in the general population, given that until 1979 they covered only a very small part of it. As a depiction of top incomes, they have been used by Alvaredo and Saez (2009) . Other work has relied on macroeconomic indicators (Prados de la Escosura, 2008). of the life-cycle and permanent income theory, consumption is a better indicator of welfare. An excellent survey of the debate is given by Gradín et al. (2008) , who compare the results of using income or consumption. Morelli et al. (2014) argue that income is conceptually a better indicator, since it measures potential consumption and therefore does not lead to confuse need with chosen frugality (following Sen, 1992) , and because current consumption may not mirror permanent income in presence of obstacles to lifetime smoothing (especially borrowing constraints).
5
The use of consumption can also arise from the acknowledgement that income is underassessed, and therefore reported consumption would actually be closer to real income than the stated revenue amounts. Expenditure data is not free of measurement issues, such as the difficulty to correctly capture durable goods consumption. But income is truly known to be underscale), which is slightly over the values he obtains for income (35.2, 32.7 and 30.6) . Some works on expenditure inequality have also been done with the data provided by another survey, the Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares, generally obtaining lower levels; see e.g. Gradín et al. (2008) or Pijoan-Mas and Sanchez-Marcos (2010).
5 Attanasio (1999) ,with cohort data from the US and the UK, shows how the variability of disposable income over the life cycle is mirrored by that of consumption, although in a less pronounced way in the case of equivalent non-durables.
Borrowing constraints have in fact been found significant for low income households in several studies, e.g. Cutanda (2003) .
estimated in many surveys, and remarkably in the case of Spain during the second half of the 20th century. We turn to this now.
Biases in the sources
The quality of the HBSs data is highly uneven. The original micro-data of 1964-65 are lost, so it is only possible to work with aggregate results published by INE. In the other cases (1973-74, 1980-81 and 1990-91) , 6 micro-data are available on-line. In this work, I am using the files provided by a team from Carlos III University, which undertook a project to facilitate their usage.
Several issues on the reliability of HBSs (as that of their counterparts in other countries) have been put forward by the literature, starting with the publications of INE itself. As may be seen in Garde et al. (1996) .
The remaining issues appear more troubling. Oversampling the higher-income strata (urban areas with wealthy inhabitants) would have helped to provide better estimates of income for rich families, since the variability among them is usually higher (this is a common method in modern statistics). On the other hand, non-response and under-reporting entail a likely underrepresentation of the rich both in quantity and income levels. Not correcting for these effects implies a potentially important bias. The problem is relatively common in this kind of surveys, stemming from lack of accounting control in the families, hiding of income from informal activities, fear of tax inspection, and so on.
Trying to confront the issue, some statistical work was already undertaken during the 1970s. Certainly, not all families in a given year spend less than they earn, but the high ratios in the Incomes in the surveys are only around 70% of those estimated in national accounting, which reinforces our suspicion that in the HBSs they are under-assessed to a considerable extent. The fact that this problem affects richer areas and non-salary income to a greater degree (as stated 8 Unit non-response is total lack of answer from one selected household, due to refusal or inability to contact it; it is different from item non-response, which arises when one household participates in the survey but fails to provide answers to selected questions. The re-weighting procedure does not eliminate the whole problem, as it can be argued for example that non-response correction should take into account also the income level of households' strata, which affects the probability of response, as suggested by Mistiaen and Ravallion (2003) . Pérez-Duarte et al. (2010) , however, show that for the Finnish wealth survey non-response bias was not substantially reduced after applying more refined re-weightings and calibrations using further variables.
9 It has to be kept in mind that these are not tax data, so the term under-reporting does not equal tax base fraud: it could be related to evasion, but also to lack of adequate accountancy, mistakes and forgetfulness, or errors in calculating yearly totals from the questions in the surveys. by e.g. Alcaide and Alcaide, 1974 and Sanz, 1995) should warn us against the use of these data without enough criticism. The under-estimation of incomes in the surveys seems more acute in the seventies than in 1990, which could indicate an improvement in the accuracy of the source and therefore a non-homogeneous bias over time -thus affecting inter-temporal comparisons. Source: author's calculations and Pena and Callealta (1996) .
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Literature with correction of HBSs
The problems surveyed in the previous subsection were known by both INE and the research community at the time. As a result, some corrections were attempted in the data. Table 5 displays the original distribution from the HBSs, together with the main adjusted estimates available.
The original distributions show a constant increase in the shares of the bottom five deciles, together with a decrease in income accruing to the top (deciles 9-10). The Gini index corresponds to that given by Goerlich and Mas (2001) in their second row in table 1. According to these data, the period of the democratic transition was very positive for the Spanish poor and middle classes.
The other columns in the table present distributions corrected for under-reporting with different procedures. J. Alcaide was the first researcher to tackle the issue, contemporaneously to the surveys. In Alcaide (2000) he showed an abrupt decrease in disposable income inequality starting at some point between 1973 and 1980, and continuing with less intensity in the following years.
His corrections on the HBSs are based on the difference between total income and total expenditure data, taking the latter as more reliable (since they adjust better to the National Accounts and households may have felt less reluctant to report them). His first step thus consisted of an upwards adjustment of income to expenditure, with data aggregated by socio-economic groups, 1973-74 1980-81 1990-91 1973-74 1980-81 1990 (*) 1973-74 1990-91 1973-74 1980-81 1990- Estruch (1996) and Pena and Callealta (1996) .
The unit of analysis is the household and the income definition used corresponds to total disposable income (not per capita, not equivalized); except for Pena's study, where it is income per capita. The Gini indices given in the cited studies are calculated out of the aggregated data, and thus underestimated with respect to those obtainable from micro-data.
(*) Alcaide's calculations for 1990 are based on a different survey, the ECPF, and therefore not strictly comparable to those of the HBS I am analysing here.
and later he scaled-up the corrected income figures to National Accounts. 12 These results have been widely accepted. Table 5 shows that his procedure provided higher inequality figures than the raw HBSs data. Since the difference is much larger for 1973-74, his calculations would depict a more powerful retreat of inequality during the years of the political transition than in the following decade. Estruch (1996) used a very similar methodology, applying it to the 1990-91 data, in his work about public spending.
Alternatively, it can be accepted as economically normal that some households consume above their yearly income, up to a certain extent. Such an approach was taken by INE's study of the 1973-74 survey, for the volume La Renta Nacional y su Distribución 1976 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 1977): they accepted as "honest" those households where the difference between total expenditure (plus net savings) and income was not bigger than 5%. 13 With those, a log-log relationship was estimated between consumption and income and used to correct the under-reported incomes. The result was also a more unequal distribution. The authors themselves considered it as a lower cap on inequality, since "honest" families were found mostly in the poorer deciles: if expenditure-income elasticity is not constant but decreasing, the concentration of income would be bigger than estimated.
A similar procedure was applied by Pena and Callealta (1996) . They first obtained underreporting correction factors by socio-economic categories, again derived from the relationship of declared income with consumption (ranging from 1.63 to 1.11). But these were not applied directly on the total income of the household: 1.06 was assigned to salaries and 1.03 to public benefits, following the results in Díaz and Fernández (1993) ; which implies that the correction factors for other income sources resulted higher as a consequence. In a second step, they applied a uniform adjustment to the National Accounts. Their result is also higher inequality than in the original surveys, with a lower reduction over time than according to Alcaide. 14 In the next section I present an alternative procedure to deal with income under-reporting, which leads to different conclusions.
tain the relative level of under-reporting of the self-employed, using only information from the surveys. Then I resort to comparison with National Accounts, but instead of employing the aggregate disposable income I make separate contrasts for the different sources of household revenue, as suggested by Oliver (1997) . This allows to obtain particular adjustment factors and therefore a more realistic view of the distribution.
Relative under-reporting of the self-employed
It is widely believed that the self-employed under-report their incomes both in tax assessments and income surveys. Pissarides and Weber (1989) were the first to suggest an estimation of this concealing of incomes by means of contrasting their expenditure levels (in food) with those of wage earners in household surveys. Their idea rested on the basic assumptions of accurate reporting of: (a) the incomes of wage earners and (b) the food expenditures of both kinds of households. The intuition is that wage earners can more easily know their exact income (because of its regularity) and have also less tax-fraud incentives to hide it in a survey (since they have less capacity to evade anyway, given withholding at source). Expenditures are generally known to be better declared than income in household surveys, and specially in the case of food, with ratios near 90-100% with respect to National Accounts. Pissarides and Weber (1989) obtained for Britain in 1982 that incomes reported by the selfemployed should be multiplied by a factor of 1.55 to obtain their true earnings. After them, a wide literature has undertaken similar calculations for other countries and time-periods, with some further methodological contributions (Lyssiotou et al., 2004; Johansson, 2005; Engström and Holmlund, 2009; Hurst et al., 2010; Tedds, 2010; Martínez-López, 2012 The procedure is based on the estimation of an Engel curve with the following form:
F being declared food expenditure, α the subsistence level, Y D total declared income, SE a dummy for self-employed households (defined as those where at least the household head or the spouse is so), Z a vector of control variables (family size, town size, and so on), and u the error term. γ is expected to be positive, implying an apparent higher consumption of food among the self-employed, which is interpreted as income under-reporting. The idea is clear in figure 1 , where γ would be the vertical difference between both regression lines, and β the slope (estimated elasticity).
The difference between real income Y R and declared income Y D (in logs) is given by: because of the formula to calculate the slope of the regression line in figure
Then we can further obtain:
k being the factor by which the self-employed's declared income should be multiplied in order to obtain their real income (under the assumption that the wage earners' reporting is correct -i.e., relative to it).
Food expenditure is used as the dependent variable for various reasons: it is one of the most accurately reported expenditures in the surveys (in terms of the adjustment with National Accounts of total resulting consumption), and we can safely assume that it is less affected by preferences than other goods. Rural households are excluded from the estimation, since they might obtain a significant part of their food supply out of the market and not report it correctly. The variable F is defined as expenditure in food (excluding alcohol and tobacco) plus foodstuff selfsupply and free meals provided by companies to their employees. It is thus supposed to capture total food consumption, except for meals at restaurants and similar establishments.
In order to make the results more robust, I have made an alternative estimation with energy consumption as the dependent variable. In the surveys, this item was asked for as the last bill, so it could be easier to report correctly, without the need to note down and control purchases that is associated with food expenditure questions. It is also less affected by the issue of eating at the firm, out of home and so on. The energy consumption reported is only that of the household as a family: i.e. explicitly excluding expenditures associated with unincorporated businesses.
The results of the estimation are shown in table 6. Taking the average k derived from both models, for each year, the self-employed would under-report their incomes by around 14-20% more than the recipients of salary income. (1), (3) and (5), a dummy for cold climate in columns (2), (4) and (6), and a constant. 
Scaling-up to National Accounts
The other source of correction is external information: a comparison of the totals for each type of income obtained from the surveys with those in National Accounts, which are considered more reliable for the aggregate results, and supposed to capture at least a part of the black economy.
This micro-macro contrast of aggregates is a common and desirable practice at present, as stated by the Canberra Expert Group (2011). The step is usual in analysis of survey or tax data in other countries, as can be seen, for instance, in ECLAC's reports, Engel et al. (1999) ; Barreix (2011) and Fairfield and Jorratt (2014) .
Complete separate income accounts for households are not available in the Spanish National Accounts before 1980. Data for 1973 is taken from Pena and Callealta (1996) , with the exception of capital incomes, which have been approximated using the percentage of dividend and interest income in "incomes from property and enterprise" in the household sector in 1969 and 1980 (the two closest available years).
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There are some coverage differences between the surveys and the National Accounts data:
namely, in the latter households appear aggregated with Private Non-Profit Institutions, and they interpreted as an increase in under-reporting, since the factor is relative to the wage-earners' behaviour. A constant reporting rate of the self-employed with increased compliance of the salaried households would also be consistent with the results. 16 In Pena and Callealta (1996) , capital incomes seem to be underestimated. I have thus used this information provided in the National Accounts publications of the pre-1970 base (where only some household flows are present).
also include people living in collective arrangements (e.g. retirement homes), who are not present in the surveys. For an extensive discussion, see Sanz (1995) . These differences are considered minor and not dealt with here.
The adjustment procedure needs to take into account that Household Surveys provide net incomes, while the figures in National Accounts are in gross terms. The corresponding taxes have therefore been subtracted from the latter before calculating the relationship between magnitudes.
Imputed incomes are not corrected, since they do not mostly derive from the respondents' answers but were estimated by INE; hence, they are also extracted a priori from both sources.
17
Scaling-up factors for each source of income have been calculated with the following formula: wage-earners). It has also been applied to rental incomes, which make part of the same category in National Accounts.
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As can be seen, the correction factors tend to decline over time, showing what seems to be the increasing reliability of the surveys. However, this is not the case with capital income, which has the highest estimated factors (together with private transfers), causing a strong upward adjustment on the affected households. This may be a reflection of structural and regulatory change.
A decrease in capital income concentration could be accompanied by growing non-reporting: a rising number of households receiving small quantities of capital income and neglecting to include them in the surveys' questionnaires. 19 On the other hand, the increase in the associated tax 17 These are non-monetary flows accruing to households, related either to wage-earning activities (in-kind compensation and meals at the workplace) or to self-employment (self-supply and housing services in owner-occupied housing).
18 Income from real estate rentals is in fact only available separately for 1990. 19 This source of misrepresentation of incomes in HBSs is dealt with in Engel et al. (1999) with a random imputation procedure (by deciles), the effect of which would presumably be a slight decrease in measured inequality. However, this choice is not taken here because it would be necessary to establish first what share of total misrepresentation corresponds Sanz (1995) and Pena and Callealta (1996) .
n/a: non applicable. The application of these coefficients to each type of income, at the micro-data level, yields a different compound correction factor to each household, as well as to every possible socioeconomic sub-group, by composition effect. Table 9 shows the resulting factors by deciles. The profiles have a J-shape, being lower at the middle part of the distribution and attaining the highest values at the very top.
to each problem (under-reporting versus non-reporting). 20 Another possible explanation for the raise in m would be that the total reference gross magnitudes used in 1973 and 1980 are underestimated, but it seems unlikely. An examination of the factor shares shows that the participation of capital income in household revenue increased during the decades considered here, from 5.5% in 1973 to 6.2% in 1980 and 10% in 1990. The accounts for both households and non-financial enterprises show a similar trend. However, it is possible that the data for 1973 reflect an extraordinary, circumstantial situation, since wage remuneration was increasing strongly in national income during the first half of the seventies and profits were decreasing. The 1980 data can also be thought of as depicting an economy with low profits, given the context of crisis.
21 Obviously, such a procedure is not completely accurate, since the distribution of both kinds of transfers, and specially public benefits, may have changed across the period. It is however preferred to applying a single factor to all households. The final outcome of the correction is a set of higher inequality estimates, compared with those resulting from the original INE data, as was originally expected. Table 10 displays the Gini indices obtained, following two different calculations. The first row shows inequality of disposable income across households, with no adjustment for household size and using them as the unit of analysis (thus giving the same importance in the estimation to a 1-member household and to a 6-member one); the second uses equivalent income and individual weights (i.e., each person is assigned the equivalent per capita income of its household and has the same importance in the estimation). The latter approach provides a better measure of inequality between individuals, but it requires some assumptions about the distribution of resources within the family and economies of scale in consumption. 22 Unsurprisingly, inequality is lower between individuals than between households, because larger families tend to have higher aggregate incomes.
As can be seen, the correction of under-reporting also implies a change in the observed trend of inequality. While the unadjusted data and the corrections from previous literature reviewed earlier showed an abrupt improvement in the distribution over time, the new corrected incomes show a much more slight change across these decades (around 1.5 Gini points). We can thus talk 22 It is assumed that all members of a household are entitled to the same level of material well-being (that they share their income equally). Regarding the elasticity of "needs" to household size and composition, here I use the OECD scale, which attaches value 1 to the first adult, 0.7 to the subsequent ones and 0.5 to the minors in the household (up to 14 years old). The choice is consistent with empirical results based on Spanish data (Bosch-Domenech, 1991; Duclos and Mercader-Prats, 1999; Labeaga et al., 2004) .
about considerable persistence in inequality. 
The evolution of the Spanish income distribution (1973-1990): an alternative picture
After addressing the bias present in the household surveys, I have obtained a distribution of incomes that involves higher inequality levels than the original data, and a very slight equalising trend in the period [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . Based on the corrected HBSs, it cannot be said that inequality fell very substantially in the period. This result contrasts with most of the literature presented in section 2, but is not necessarily at odds with studies based on tax or macroeconomic data, which are reviewed in the following subsection.
Comparing with other approaches to Spanish inequality
The results in this paper differ from those previously obtained using the survey data, because I estimate a higher level of inequality and a smaller decrease over time. This includes the studies reviewed in section 2, based on the HBSs, and also those which have used a different source, the Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares. This is a rotating household panel also provided by INE, with quarterly data and households staying in the sample for a maximum of 2 years.
The ECPF consistently displays lower levels of inequality than the HBSs (EPFs). One reason for it might be that it suffers from a larger downward bias, because of sample size and the definition of income employed (notably excluding certain capital incomes). According to some reputable sources, this results in its low reliability for the study of inequality (Eurostat, 1999; Goerlich and Mas, 1999) . Its higher discrepancy with respect to National Accounts can be seen in Pou and Alegre (2002) . is not completely irreconcilable: in fact, a decrease in inequality in the second half of the eighties could be compatible with a general stability, when the whole decade is considered (specially knowing that a whole cycle of recession and growth took place during the eighties, and rates of unemployment were similar at the beginning and the end of the decade, at around 15%). Falling inequality in labour market revenues of household heads is also found for the entire decade in the HBSs by Abadie (1997) and in my scaled-up data.
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My results can also be compared with studies on the evolution of inequality based on other kinds of data. Prados de la Escosura (2008) provided a long-run estimation based on a macroeconomic approach, calculating dispersion within and between the incomes of "workers" and "capitalists". His series show a rapid decrease in inequality in Spain between the mid 1950s and the mid 1960s, followed by a much slower diminishing trend since then and until the second half of the 1990s, when inequality would have started to go upwards again. The persistence I obtain is therefore quite consistent with Prados de la Escosura's calculations.
For the post-transition period it is also possible to use income tax data and assess the evolution of inequality in taxable income. By definition, however, the levels and trend do not need to coincide with those of disposable income: between both lie direct taxes, transfers and the impact of fraud. There are also other methodological differences, discussed in Ayala and Onrubia (2001): generally, tax-based studies use the taxpayer as the unit of analysis (as opposed to the household, and without applying equivalence scales) and have different universes (given by the effective income threshold to personal direct taxation). This category of taxpayers was also changing over the years: new taxpayers were coming in because the tax was being introduced, and also as an effect of fiscal drag. All of this explains why tax data generally show a higher level of inequality than survey data, and a worsening in (reported taxable) income distribution during the eighties (Castañer, 1991; Lambert and Ramos, 1997; Ayala and Onrubia, 2001 ). The study closest to our discussion is that by Onrubia et al. (2007) , which includes calculations for the "fiscal household"
(thus homogenizing the periods before and after the introduction of the separate filing option for married couples). The pre-tax income Gini index (taxable base with some adjustments) was found to increase continuously from 1982 to 1991 (31.68 to 42.00).
Alvaredo and Saez (2009) (2.14% in 1990). 25 The same trend is shown in the share of the top 1% (7.5% to 8.37% in 1981 and 1990 ) and the top 10% (32.61% to 35.35% in the same years). It should come as no surprise that the figures are dissimilar for disposable income: in my work, I obtain for the top 1% of households 6.47% in 1973, 5.99% in 1980 and 7.15% in 1990 .
The international comparison picture is also affected. Previous work has usually concluded that Spain started with a higher-than-average inequality level with respect to developed countries and converged during this period. This was a consequence of the equalising trend found in Spain, together with the opposite evolution in several other economies in the eighties (Ayala et al., 1996; Pena and Callealta, 1996) . The conclusion is thus in line with the process of Europeanization during the years of the democratic transition and the entry at the EEC.
Using my new data, this result can be nuanced. In table 11 I show the Gini indices for disposable per capita income in selected OECD countries (this is not my preferred estimate shown previously, but it is used here for the sake of comparison). It can be seen that Spain was similar to Italy, the US and Canada at the beginning, with significantly higher inequality than the UK, Germany and Sweden; by 1990, the country remained in the first positions of the ranking. The most significant evolution was the growth in income concentration in the UK, which joined the more unequal countries in the group, and the reverse trend in Italy and Canada. Throughout the period, Spain remained more unequal than the European chore, with no significant convergence to it. Notes: International data correspond to the nearest available year. The indices for the US are not strictly comparable, since they refer to households instead of individuals.
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25 Tables B2 and B3 
Relative inequality and its composition
The inspection of decile shares based on the corrected disposable income data allows a deeper analysis of the evolution of income distribution. In table 12 inequality among households is shown to have been quite stable over these decades (consistent with the Gini indices in the first row of table 10). Interpersonal inequality, which is approached by the distribution of equivalent income in columns 5-7, is slightly lower. In any case, the absence of a clear trend remains. The bottom-half deciles increased their share, but the changes are small and erratic. It is nonetheless most likely that the roots of inequality in the economy changed during these decades. The capital-labour ratio had been decreasing in the last years of the dictatorship as a short-term response to the crisis, and could have increased again later because of liberalization.
Most advanced industrial economies have experienced a recent increase in wage and salaries dispersion. These trends, together with the increase in unemployment, could have counteracted to some extent the equalizing force of public benefits expansion and the introduction of progressivity in the tax system.
27
Entering such debate in depth is out of the scope of this paper, but the decomposition of dis- 27 The tax reform starting in 1977 is an important cornerstone in the political transition, since it meant to base the collection of taxes on the principles of equity and efficiency, the first meaning progressive taxation. The implementation of the new system, however, does not seem to have been very successful in this aspect (Torregrosa, nd) . On the other hand, it should be noted that our three observations are to a certain extent also a result of short-term fluctuations: 1973 was the culmination of the pre-oil-shock growth in the country, while 1980 was a period of economic distress, and in 1990 the country was back on the ascending side of the cycle. We cannot make strong conclusions out of them.
posable income can provide an idea of the forces behind inequality change. This is done in figure   2 . Apart from wages, self-employment income, capital income and transfers, two kinds of imputed incomes are included. These are non-monetary flows accruing to households, that have been given an approximate value in the survey. 'WE imputations' (those related to wage-earning activities) include in-kind compensation and meals at the workplace, while 'SE imputations' (related to self-employment) are self-supply and housing services in owner-occupied housing. Employment incomes were clearly the main components of disposable household resources.
But their share decreased over time (accounting each year for 53%, 50% and 43%, respectively).
The items gaining weight were mainly transfers (due to the development of the welfare state:
total transfers increased from 14% to 25%) and capital income (from 4% to 6%). Because capital income is concentrated at the top, while public benefits go mainly to the bottom, both changes could have counteracting effects on total inequality. Also self-employment imputations had a growing participation (from 7% to 13%), mainly due to the imputed rentals from owner-occupied housing.
This general composition of disposable income is of course very variable along the social ladder, as can be seen in figure 3. In the bottom deciles transfers and salary income make up most revenues. Social benefits and private transfers are regrettably not disaggregated in the 1973 and 1980 data, but the progressive nature of the first can be seen clearly in 1990. Wages have maximum participation in the middle deciles, and self-employment income is somewhat skewed to the top in the first years. Revenues from capital are the most concentrated: almost absent in the 28 The imputation of income from owner-occupied housing is conceptually important but empirically complicated. Using only monetary components to measure the possible standards of living of the households can be highly misleading if renters coexist with owner-occupiers, which is of course the case here (although around 80% of the households fall in the second category). The survey includes this variable, which is an approximation to the rent a household would pay if it rented its dwelling. The calculations are certainly not flawless, and moreover it should only be imputed in the percentage that the house is paid (i.e., 100% if the family totally owns its house, 50% if half of it is still owed to the bank). This adjustment is not possible here because of lack of data. However, I consider necessary to include this element, specially in a context marked by rising prices of dwelling and with the housing bubble in the horizon.
lower classes, they constitute over 10% of income for the upper deciles. This pattern is similar in other countries (e.g. Piketty, 2003) . In all cases incomes are equivalised by household size, using the OECD scale. Figure 4 plots inequality for each component of income, following the decomposition method originally developed by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) . It shows that employment incomes got slightly more concentrated over the period: wages and salaries went from 50.6 to 53.2 Gini points, and self-employment income from 84.1 to 86.6. 29 The element with the most uneven distribution is capital income (99-95 Gini points), the increasing participation of which also pulled up total inequality. These forces were offset by a more homogeneous distribution of SE imputations and transfers, income sources which, as we have seen, experienced substantial growth over the period.
Further nuances: levels and extraction
The apparent stability of the Gini index does not imply the absence of several interesting distributive changes. A different image emerges if we depart from inequality and take a look at the levels of income. power during the period. 30 The profiles of growth are however dissimilar in the two sub-periods:
while during the seventies growth was higher at the lower-mid levels, in the nineties it was the extremes which benefitted the most (pointing towards the expansion in Welfare State's transfers in the case of the low-income households). If we look at the top 1%, we even find stagnation in the first sub-period (the oil-crisis decade) and a very significant recovery in the second. The ratios in the last rows confirm the same impression of a weak decrease in economic distances.
Let us recall that the Gini index and other related indicators measure relative inequality (i.e., independent from the scale: constant if all incomes are multiplied by the same factor). If absolute differences in income are also thought to be important, we can calculate an absolute Gini, which is the same index without normalization to the mean (as put forward by Ravallion, 2003 , following Kolm, 1976 . Doing this exercise with the three years, we get an increase in the absolute inequality index of 25% between 1973 and 1990. Relative economic distances did not change that much, but they did in absolute terms, in actual consumption capacity.
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Relative inequality can in turn be put in perspective by evaluating the "extractive" nature of the economy. Following the intuition in Milanovic et al. (2011) , as income per capita grows, 30 Disposable income is an indicator of consumption capacity of the households, but it should be borne in mind that it is still subject to indirect taxes, so changes in consumption taxation also affect final material well-being. 31 The issue is more complicated. If we take into account diminishing utility of incomes, it can be argued that absolute differences in income would be more accurately expressed after some kind of functional transformation to reflect it. society's surplus gets bigger and therefore a higher inequality becomes feasible. This is the idea behind the concept of the "inequality possibility frontier" (IPF), the maximum level of inequality where all surplus (income above the physiological subsistence minimum of the population) is appropriated by one individual. The "inequality extraction ratio" (IER) can then be calculated as actual inequality divided by the IPF. In our case, given the substantial economic growth seen in the country during these years, it seems quite risk-free to venture that a persistent Gini was compatible with a decreasing extraction ratio.
It can be argued that using a physiological subsistence minimum is not very accurate, since human 'needs' would increase as does the general living standard in a society. In that sense, Milanovic (2013b) introduces a variation in the calculation of the IPF, in which the maximum possible Gini is a function of the "social minimum", which takes into account the mean income of the population. The definition for the maximum possible Gini is:
where m is mean income (per capita GDP) and σ is the social minimum, defined as:
with α = m/s representing how far a society is from physiological subsistence s (considered as 400$ PPP 1990), and b being the elasticity of the social minimum with respect to α. We can then obtain:
Milanovic uses the value b=0.5 as an approximation (based on some evidence from official poverty lines and subjective poverty surveys), which simplifies the expression to:
Using that formula, I could confirm the intuition that persistent relative inequality coexisted with a decreasing extraction ratio (table 14) . Milanovic (2013b) .
α is calculated as the relation between GDP per capita and the physiological subsistence level. IER, the Inequality Extraction Ratio, is the actual Gini as a percentage of the maximum "feasible" Gini (both with per capita income).
At the beginning of the period, Spain displayed a level of inequality just a little above that of the UK, but higher extraction (because of the "size of the pie" being smaller). Around 1990, IERs in Spain and the UK had got very similar, as a result of a different trend: while the Englishspeaking countries show an increase in both indicators during the eighties, in Spain the capacity of the elites to extract surplus seems to have been getting slightly weaker. Most of the change happened during the first decade, which witnessed the political transition, but still maybe very soon to evaluate the effects of the associated reforms. We could therefore ask ourselves whether there is a significant relationship between extraction and regime change. The question will be tackled by future research.
Concluding remarks
In this paper I have analysed the sources available on disposable income distribution in Spain during the years surrounding the transition to democracy. The main data come from the Household Budget Surveys conducted by the INE, which contain very rich information but need to be used with caution. It is widely known that they suffer from severe under-reporting -and, furthermore, that this is not homogeneous across income sources. Such a problem entails that the under-estimation of incomes is not homogeneous across income levels, biasing the inequality indices readily obtained from the data.
I have performed a two-step correction procedure, trying to identify under-reporting first with an Engel's curve approach (contrasting the self-employed with the wage-earners in their incomes and food/energy expenditure) and then with an aggregate adjustment to the magnitudes of the household sector given in National Accounts. The results allow to question the conventional wisdom that inequality strongly diminished in Spain during these decades. The Gini indices of all surveys are pulled up by the correction, and the trend across the years significantly weakens.
This leads directly to asking another question. Did transition to democracy not introduce significant distributive improvements? Political economy theory would expect from democracy an inclination to favour the lower classes (at least, relative to a right-wing dictatorship as Spain had recently suffered), via labour market regulation, welfare state benefits, and progressive taxation.
We do witness an increase in the importance of transfers received by the households at the bottom of the distribution, reflecting Welfare State development in the years after 1977. But they did not outdo forces pulling in the opposite direction. The tax system did not turn out progressive (Torregrosa, nd) . The absolute gains from growth went mostly to the upper classes.
Economic growth and decline in inequality in the years after 1950 were suggested to facilitate the transition in the 1970s. Prados de la Escosura (2008) This is, of course, a political choice, reflecting the equilibrium between classes or interest groups in the young parliamentary state. In that sense, the lack of economic equalization could be enlightening about the access to political power. Future work will explore the relationship between inequality and political transitions in a broader comparative context, with special attention to Latin American countries, which could provide valuable insights. Source: author's calculations. In all indices, the first row represents distribution between household, while the other three depict distribution between individuals according to different equivalence scales. The OECD original and modified scales apply weights 0.7-0.5 and 0.4-0.3 respectively to subsequent adults and minors in the household. The 'Sqroot' scale uses the square root of the household size.
Appendices
A Data aggregates comparison
All calculations refer to disposable income. Gross incomes are expected to be more unequally distributed under a progressive direct tax system (which applies specially to 1990).
